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A Bilateral Trade Agreement




Translated from the French original by Michael Black
1 On June 29th 2003 the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Hong Kong and mainland
China  signed  a  bilateral  trade  agreement,  known  by  its  English  acronym  as  CEPA
(Closer  Economic  Partnership  Arrangement)1.  This  agreement  is  made  up  of  three
sections: tariff reductions on 273 categories of goods that Hong Kong exports to the
People’s Republic of China (PRC); a preferential opening of the Chinese market to Hong
Kong service providers in 17 sectors (increased to 18 in September 2003); and a series of
measures  aimed at  facilitating bilateral  exchanges  of  goods,  capital  and people.  On
September  29th  2003,  Hong  Kong  and  the  PRC  signed  six  annexes  to  the  main
agreement.  The  aim  of  these  annexes was  to  clarify  and  complete  the  original
provisions  of  the  CEPA.  Annexes  1  to  3  deal  with  trade  in  goods  and  define,  in
particular, related rules, the origin of the goods and the procedures for registration and
verification of certificates of origin. Annexes 4 and 5 deal with the second section of the
agreement, with the addition of the telecommunications sector, and the definition of
the  term  “Hong  Kong  service  provider”.  Annex  6  defines  six  fields  for  special  co-
operation between Hong Kong and China.
2 With  the  exception  of  a  certain  number  of  these  measures  (opening  up  in  the
telecommunications sector, the provision of individual visas for tourists from certain
regions  of  mainland  China  visiting  Hong  Kong…),  which  were  implemented  in  the
autumn of 2003, the agreement came into effect on January 1st 2004. Both parties have
committed themselves to continue negotiations to extend this  agreement at  a later
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stage. The CEPA conforms to Article 24 of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) on bilateral agreements and is compatible with the rules of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO),  which was an essential  condition of  its  application,  since both
parties are separate members of the WTO. This is the first bilateral agreement to be
signed by Hong Kong and the first to be signed by mainland China with a member of
the WTO. 
3 This agreement is the result of an initiative on the part of business circles and more
particularly by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC), in response to
anxieties about the future of the SAR as a “gateway” between China and the rest of the
world, which were fuelled by the economic slowdown in 2001. Despite its reservations,
the government of Hong Kong backed the initiative and obtained, in December 2001, an
agreement  in  principle  from  the  central  government.  It  took  eighteen  months  to
conclude the CEPA.
4 The unilateral concessions accepted by mainland China have limited practical range.
The tariff  reductions concern only a  very small  part  of  a  bilateral  trade which has
shrunk rapidly in the last few years.  The preferential  measures allowed Hong Kong
service  providers  certain  advantages  which,  in  most  cases,  are  limited  in  concrete
terms as well as in time, as they come ahead of the measures inscribed in the calendar
for  the  liberalisation  called  for  in  China’s  protocol  for  entry  to  the  WTO.  Such
advantage is even in doubt in some sectors, due to the acceleration of China’s opening
up. Of greater significance is the symbolic reach of this agreement. It firstly emphasised
the commitment of  the Chinese authorities  to maintaining Hong Kong’s  prosperity,
although the reinforcing of this commitment may appear as compensation for a highly
conservative approach to political reform. Above all, it allowed Hong Kong to benefit in
terms of  image by reminding all  concerned that,  on the one hand,  the Hong Kong
economy would be one of the principal beneficiaries of China’s accession to the WTO,
and that, on the other, the principle of “one country, two systems” produces significant
benefits for the Special Administrative Region.
China agrees to unilateral tariff reduction
5 Since January 1st 2004, 273 categories of products (according to the nomenclature of
the Chinese customs) of Hong Kong origin are no longer subject to import duties to
mainland China. Included are many of products related to watches, jewellery, textiles
and clothing, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and the electrical and electronics
industries. PRC import duties remain high on some of these products: from 27% to 35%
for jewellery, from 18% to 22% for cosmetics, from 14% to 23% for watches, and from 5%
to 30% for electrical and electronic products. The agreement is to be extended from
January 1st 2005 to further categories of products as proposed by Hong Kong exporters
and approved by the Hong Kong and Chinese authorities. As of January 1st 2006, all
exports of products of Hong Kong origin will be exempted from import duties.
6 The definition of the “rules of origin” of products is spelled out in Annex 2. About 67%
of the 273 products covered by the agreement (including jewellery, textiles, clothing,
cosmetics, paper, and plastics) are covered by the criteria of origin currently in force in
Hong Kong, in conformity with Article VII  of  the GATT which requires “substantial
transformation”, defined case by case. In 17% of categories, among them chemical and
metal products and certain electronic products, this “substantial transformation” must
be  significant  enough  to  lead  to  a  change  in  tariff  heading,  according  to  the
international four-digit nomenclature. The agreement thus uses the provision, which is
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fairly widespread in matters of product origin, of Change in Tariff Heading. Finally, for
the  remaining  16% of  categories  (among  them  watch  and  optical  components)  the
production  or  transformation  costs  in  Hong  Kong  (including  product  development
costs) must represent at least 30% of the FOB (Free On Board) export price. While Hong
Kong had to make concessions to the Chinese on this percentage (their objective had
been to set this at 25%), they were nevertheless successful in having development costs
included in the calculation.
7 Annex 1 and Annex 3 respectively stipulate the conditions for the drawing up by both
parties of complementary lists of products eligible for the lifting of tariffs on entry to
mainland China, and the formalities for obtaining certificates of origin.
8 Hong  Kong  being  a  duty-free  region,  the  concessions  agreed  to  by  China  are  of  a
unilateral  character,  although they are  formally  linked,  in  the  agreement,  to  Hong
Kong’s commitment not to impose any restrictions on imports coming from the PRC.
Moreover,  both  parties  have  committed  themselves  not  to  take  any  mutual
protectionary measures nor engage in anti-dumping procedures, this last agreement
formalising practice at present.
A measure with limited effect
9 According to the Hong Kong Government, 90% of exports of Hong Kong origin to China
will be exempt from tariffs once the agreement comes into force. Hong Kong’s domestic
exports to the mainland reached HK$36.7 billion (US$4.7 billion) in 2003; they represent
30% of total Hong Kong product exports, but only 2.1% of Hong Kong’s total exports
which include, in particular, Chinese products in transit through Hong Kong. The flow
has  slowed significantly  since  1997,  due  to  delocalisation,  now almost  complete,  of
Hong Kong’s manufacturing industry.
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Exports of products of Hong Kong origin to Mainland China (billions of HK$)
Source: Census and Statistic Department, Hong Kong.
10 Over  two-thirds  (70%)  of  these  trade  flows  are,  moreover,  linked  to  outsourcing
operations or exchanges within companies which are, to a large extent, already tariff-
free. Thus the overall “static” benefit (i.e. based on exports in 2003) from the lowering
of tariffs is estimated, apparently generously, by the Hong Kong Government at HK$750
million (US$100 million), or less than 2% of total Hong Kong domestic exports to the
PRC. On the scale of Hong Kong’s economy, this benefit is not significant.
11 Over  the  first  four  months  of  the  agreement,  in  the  framework  of  the  CEPA,  869
certificates of origin were requested and 813 approved, mostly in textiles and clothing
(310 approved) and pharmaceutical products (209 approved). During the first quarter of
2004, the fall in exports of products of Hong Kong origin to China continued, albeit
more  slowly  than  in  2003  (-8.4%  as  against  -11.9%),  without  it  being  possible  to
attribute this change to the CEPA. The value of products made tariff-free thanks to the
CEPA amounted to less than HK$400 million (US$50 million) between January 1st and
May 21st 2004.
12 Can one expect,  from this lowering of tariffs,  the emergence of new manufacturing
activities in the SAR? Taking into account the differences in costs between mainland
China and Hong Kong,  in particular real  estate and labour costs,  the tariff  benefits
seem, on the face of it, insufficient to encourage manufacturers to locate some of their
production capacities in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong authorities and business circles
have nonetheless identified certain products whose manufacture in Hong Kong may be
potentially profitable in the light of the clauses in the CEPA: either they are subject to
high tariffs on entry to China (like jewellery, ice cream, and certain parts for consumer
electronics)  or  they  have  a  high  immaterial  content  (such  as  brand,  design  or
technological innovation) which corresponds to Hong Kong’s comparative advantages
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(in perfume, eyewear, clothing and tableware). Intellectual property rights protection,
strong in  Hong Kong,  weak  or  non-existent  in  China,  constitutes  a  factor  likely  to
compensate the cost differential in the production of this last category of goods.
13 More than forty requests have been made to extend the scope of the CEPA to cover
other  products  which,  in  most  cases,  are  not  manufactured in  Hong Kong.  But  the
procedure for extending the agreement is long and complex, and the abolition of tariffs
cannot take effect until January 1st 2005. In any case, this would only provide a year’s
advance  on  the  total  abolition  of  tariffs  on  all  domestic  exports  of  Hong  Kong  to
mainland China on January 1st 2006.
14 Six months after the application of the agreement, projects are still slow to materialise,
although some interest has been expressed. Neither business circles nor the authorities
harboured  any  illusions  in  that  regard.  Thus  the  Hong  Kong  Trade  Development
Council,  the  organisation  which  promotes  Hong  Kong’s  foreign  trade  and  a  keen
supporter of the CEPA, indicated in November 2003: “the creation of manufacturing
activities  thanks  to  the  CEPA  is  likely  to  be  limited  and  the  effects  in  terms  of
employment creation or of trade flows is likely to be moderate”. The HKGCC points out
the existence of projects in textiles (Ralph Lauren), biotechnology (CK Life Sciences),
chemicals,  Chinese  medicine  products,  perfumes  and  even  the steel  industry.  The
creation,  as  called  for  by  business  circles,  of  a  special  trans-border  zone  where
companies could, on Hong Kong territory, employ mainland Chinese workers, would no
doubt make it possible to increase the benefits of the CEPA in this domain.
A preferential opening in servicesMeasures of varying importance
15 The CEPA covers, by means of a restrictive list of 18 subsectors, most of the services
sector, in particular financial services (banking, insurance, security transactions, asset
management),  various  services  to  companies  (legal  advice,  auditing,  accounting),
transport, logistics (including warehousing and services for goods in transit), building
and public works, retailing, health, tourism, audiovisual, advertising, the organisation
of fairs and exhibitions, and telecommunications. The range of the agreement is thus
very  wide,  although  in  some  sectors  the  concessions  made  are  very  limited.  It  is
noticeable that the education sector is not included, despite Hong Kong’s ambitions in
that area.
16 The  preferential  opening  measures,  highly  variable  according  to  sector,  generally
include a shortening of the calendar for liberalisation provided for in the framework of
China’s entry protocol to the WTO and/or additional liberalisation measures and/or a
relaxing of the access criteria applied to foreign companies. There again, it is a largely
unilateral  commitment,  although  Hong  Kong  is  committed  to  not  taking  any  new
discriminatory measures against the PRC, for access to the 18 subsectors covered by the
agreement. This second clause may provide mainland China with some benefits: the
growth of Hong Kong direct investment, and the acquisition of know-how ahead of the
opening of the services sector to foreign competition.
17 Over and above the diversity of sectors, Hong Kong service providers will benefit from
three main advantages:
• They will benefit before foreign companies from the liberalisation measures provided for in
the protocol for entry to the WTO. This advantage is time limited (four years at most but
generally less than two years), and is based on the supposition that there is an advantage to
the first mover, which remains to be demonstrated.
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• They will benefit from opening measures which go beyond the framework of the WTO entry
protocol. In this case, as above, the main advantage conceded to Hong Kong service
providers is the possibility of creating a wholly-owned subsidiary or of holding a majority
stake or a controlling minority in joint ventures. As relations with the Chinese partner, who
is often imposed by the authorities, are often difficult and generate significant direct costs
(remuneration higher than the real contribution made), or indirect costs (differences in
strategy), this advantage is substantial.
• Lastly, they will be subject to lower quantitative thresholds of access to the Chinese market
than those applied to foreign companies. The most characteristic example is the reduction
from US$20 million to US$6 million of the minimum assets required for a foreign bank to
open a branch in mainland China.
18 Table  2  summarises  the  assessment  by  Hong  Kong  business  circles  of  this  second
section, just after it was signed. One must point out that this assessment has been made
partly  obsolete  by  the  evolution  of  Chinese  legislation.  The  liberalisation  measures
introduced in early 2004, in the retail and import/export sector, have wiped out the
main  advantages  contained  in  the  CEPA.  In  contrast with  the  tariff  clause,  the
liberalisation  of  services  has  been  hailed in  business  circles  as  significant  or  even
substantial progress. “The impact of the CEPA on the services sector should be much
greater than that on the manufacturing sector”, was the judgement of the Hong Kong
Trade Development  Council;  “the  CEPA is  an exceptional  opportunity  for  the  Hong
Kong services industry” wrote the HKGCC.
 
Assessment by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce of the effects of the services clause
of the CEPA
Source: Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce.
A very open definition of Hong Kong companies
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19 The definition of “Hong Kong companies” was a central issue in the negotiation of this
clause of the agreement, all the more so as the GATT and WTO texts give little detail on
this subject. Both parties finally agreed on a pragmatic and open definition, based on
participation in the economic activity of the SAR rather than on the nationality of the
capital holders. Annex 5 of the CEPA contains a definition of a Hong Kong company,
with variable parameters depending on the services industry concerned, which is based
on three criteria:
• The company must have been registered in Hong Kong in accordance with Hong Kong
company law, the subsidiaries of foreign companies being excluded (in this respect, one
should point out the case of Standard Chartered, one of the three commercial banks which
issues the Hong Kong dollar, but which, being established in Hong Kong as a branch, has not
been eligible for the benefits of the CEPA).
• It must have substantial activity, the evidence for which is based on an analysis of four
distinct criteria: the nature and volume of business carried out in Hong Kong, liability to
Hong Kong profits tax, at least three years of existence and business activity (five years in
the construction and engineering sectors, no such condition being imposed on real estate
agencies), and the existence of wholly owned or leased offices, mere “post boxes” being
excluded from the benefits of the agreement.
• The company must employ at least 50% of its personnel in Hong Kong.
20 The  description  “Hong  Kong  service  provider”,  which  bestows  the  right  to  the
exceptional advantages given in the field of services, is extended in Annex 5 to physical
persons, provided they have the status of permanent resident in Hong Kong. Annex 5
stipulates the procedure for obtaining the description of “Hong Kong service provider”.
21 It is none the less noticeable that benefits from the opening of the legal profession and
of insurance actuaries are reserved for residents of Hong Kong who are Chinese citizens
(a  necessary  precondition  for  Hong  Kong  citizenship),  thereby  excluding  residents,
even  permanent,  of  foreign  origin,  who  are  very  numerous  in  these  professions.
Similarly, permission to open a retail business in Guangdong without a Chinese partner
is reserved for Chinese citizens. Apart from these exceptions, the definition agreed for
“Hong Kong company” is very open, and does not discriminate against companies with
foreign capital, or service providers of foreign nationality. This open definition, which
in accordance with Hong Kong’s vocation as an international services market, is one of
the PRC’s major concessions in this agreement.
The direct consequences are likely to be disappointing
22 The Hong Kong authorities, professional bodies and chambers of commerce have made
major  communication  and promotion  efforts  about  the  second clause  of  the  CEPA,
which  they  consider  to  be  promising,  aimed  at  the  local  business  community  and
abroad. The number of requests made to the Hong Kong authorities (298 at the end of
April 2004, of which 242 have been approved) is significant. Most of the requests come
from three sectors: logistics (157), retailing (65) and advertising (23). It is noteworthy
that the recent measures for the liberalisation of retailing and import/export activities
may wipe out the advantages that the CEPA may offer in these sectors. Among other
sectors showing interest are telecommunications (in services with high added value),
engineering,  the organisation of  fairs  and exhibitions,  and banking.  In the banking
sector in particular,  two of  the eight Hong Kong banks which can potentially open
branches in China through the CEPA, have done so.
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23 The  advantage  is,  however,  smaller  than  was  probably  expected,  at  least  in  part
because of  the difficulties  of  application of  the CEPA in the mainland.  The Chinese
authorities have stated that they have made most of the legislative effort necessary: 26
of the 29 texts which had to be amended for the CEPA to come into effect have been
amended, and the legislative and regulatory work should have been finished before
mid-2004.  The  enforcement  of  the  agreement  remains  problematical,  however:  the
procedure  is  complex  and opaque,  and decisions  are  subject  to  the  bureaucracy  of
central  government,  and then to  the arbitrary nature of  local  authorities.  Pressure
from the Hong Kong authorities and business circles has made it possible to simplify
procedures (for example in Shanghai and in Guangdong, where a single office has been
set up to deal with CEPA authorisations), but the number of administrations involved in
certain sectors is very high. Lastly, the CEPA is no exception to the rule that in China a
number of irregular obstacles tend to substitute for legal obstacles which have been
abolished or relaxed. In this context, many Hong Kong service providers stick with the
solutions they had in many cases already established,  in order to adapt to Chinese
regulations or to get around them.
24 The impact must also be assessed in terms of the attracting of new investment to Hong
Kong. The HKGCC and business circles point to some interest as indicated by several
announcements and plans for  mergers and acquisitions linked to this  clause of  the
CEPA (for example the acquisition by the Hong Kong bus company KMB of a Chinese
company, and the plan for the Standard Chartered Bank to buy a Hong Kong bank in
order to benefit from the CEPA).
Subsidiary and complementary measures with major effects
25 Overshadowed by the main measures,  some secondary provisions of  the CEPA have
already had major effects  on the Hong Kong economy. For example the possibility,
which is an exception to the existing legislation, for tourists from certain cities and
regions of mainland China to travel individually to Hong Kong has boosted the growth
of Chinese tourism in the SAR. Almost three million Chinese tourists visited Hong Kong
in the first quarter of 2004 (an increase of 40% compared with 2003), of whom nearly
40% had an individual visa. In this domain, the Hong Kong authorities are hoping to
hear very soon that the SAR’s travel agents will be allowed to offer foreign packages to
groups of Chinese tourists, under the same conditions as Chinese travel agents.
26 Moreover, the authorisation given to Hong Kong traders to open shops under their own
names  and  without  any  access  conditions,  in  Guangdong  province,  has  already,
according to the HKGCC, led to the opening of 400 outlets.
27 Numerous complementary measures to facilitate the movement of people and capital
between China and Hong Kong have been taken over the last few months and are part
of the spirit, if not the text, of the agreement. Among the most important are to be
noted  the  relaxing  of  exchange  controls  (the  raising  of  currency  exit  ceilings  for
Chinese  tourists  going to  Hong Kong,  the  possibility  for  Hong Kong banks  to  offer
services  in  renminbi)  and  the  reciprocal  recognition  of  qualifications  and/or
establishment of professional examinations (for architects, site managers, building and
structure  engineers,  insurance  agents,  intellectual  property  consultants…).  This
preferential treatment makes it possible for Hong Kong to position itself no longer as
merely  the  market  for  China’s  external  financing  but  as  the  market  for  the
management  of  Chinese  savings  invested  abroad.  The  reciprocal  recognition  of
qualifications is a necessary condition for the effectiveness of the second section of the
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CEPA. Moreover, the Hong Kong authorities are concentrating their efforts in these two
fields,  by  negotiating  an  extension  of  reciprocal  recognition  in  particular  in  the
medical, legal and accounting professions, and a relaxation of exchange controls for the
investment of Chinese portfolios invested or managed in Hong Kong.
Powerful symbolic and political effects
28 The CEPA is highly significant politically. Signed at the end of June 2003 on the occasion
of the official visit by the new Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, to the SAR, the
agreement  shows  that  the  maintenance  of  Hong  Kong’s  prosperity  remains  the
essential  objective  of  the  PRC’s  policy  towards  the  SAR,  in  particular  because  the
Chinese authorities see it as the main factor in the maintaining of political stability in
Hong Kong, as well as in the success of the “one country, two systems” principle. The
CEPA thus constitutes the most visible sign of the desire of the Chinese authorities to
make  Hong  Kong  benefit  from  China’s  growth,  by  accentuating  economic
interpenetration,  without  calling  into  question  the  total  autonomy  of  Hong  Kong’s
economic territory, which has also been symbolically reinforced by the conclusion of a
bilateral trade agreement.
29 In  terms  of  image,  the  benefits  to  Hong  Kong  are  considerable.  The  manifest
convergence  of  interests  demonstrated  by  the  CEPA,  between  Hong  Kong  and  the
central  authorities,  makes the refrain about the decline in Hong Kong’s role as the
market for services to and from China less accurate. The Hong Kong authorities now
have at their disposal regulatory measures to provide arguments for the importance of
this role, even though non-regulatory comparative advantages (the guanxi,  linguistic
and professional capabilities, experience of both Chinese and foreign markets) remain
decisive.
30 Moreover, the CEPA is the first bilateral commercial agreement to have been signed by
Hong Kong. Another agreement is under negotiation with New Zealand. While the Hong
Kong authorities do not question the priority given to multilateral negotiations, they
make no secret of their desire to participate, as does Singapore, in the proliferation of
bilateral and regional agreements in order to enhance the SAR’s image as a regional
trading market. 
31 Beyond its direct consequences, the CEPA recalls and highlights some major features of
economic  relations  between  Hong  Kong  and  China  which  are  often  forgotten  or
overlooked. The two economies are increasingly interdependent and, particularly, the
Hong  Kong  economy’s  dependence  on  the  PRC  has  grown  considerably.  The  two
economies are still not so deeply integrated: the movement of goods, people and capital
is regulated and thus limited. Greater integration is possible, although it will quickly
reach its limits, on the one hand if the principle of “one country, two systems” is not to
be called into question, and on the other hand because of the extent of the differences
in  levels  of  development  and  per  capita  income.  Interpreted  pragmatically,  the
ambiguities of the slogan “one country, two systems” remain fertile in economic terms.
Economic  territory  independent  from  China,  but  under  Chinese  sovereignty,  Hong
Kong has a legal and judicial system totally independent of and different from China’s.
And Hong Kong’s geopolitical situation remains one of, if not its principal, comparative
advantage.
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APPENDIXES
The principal measures in the services sector2
Strategy consultancy
With the exception of certain types of strategy consultancy, Hong Kong companies
have the right to set up, four years ahead of the WTO calendar, wholly-owned
companies in mainland China. The minimum capital required is likely to be the same as
for Chinese companies, i.e. 100,000 yuan (as against the present amount of between
US$100,000 and US$500,000 for foreign companies). 
The agreement does not define the legal form in which Hong Kong companies will be
able to establish wholly-owned companies in mainland China. The legal form
authorised could have numerous implications for Hong Kong investors, in particular
concerning the possibility of repatriating profits.
Moreover, it is unlikely that CEPA will apply to consultancy companies in the education
and training sectors (in which Hong Kong has major expertise) in as much as these
sectors are highly controlled by the Chinese authorities.
Accounting
Hong Kong accountants who have already obtained mainland China’s diploma in
accountancy and have exercised their profession on the mainland, are treated on an
equal footing with mainland Chinese accountants where the annual number of working
hours in the PRC is concerned.
The validity of the temporary licence for accountancy, given to Hong Kong auditors to
carry out assignments in mainland China, has been extended from 6 months to 1 year.
It is interesting to note that the requirement to obtain a licence is a restriction peculiar
to China which does not correspond to the norms in force in OECD countries (a foreign
accountancy firm can, for example, freely carry out an accountancy assignment in
Hong Kong, without government authorisation). In 2003, Hong Kong accounting firms
had opened 18 representative offices and seven joint ventures in China.
Banking
The agreement makes clear the Chinese government’s desire to provide Hong Kong, up
to 2007, with a privileged means of access to the Chinese banking market. CEPA
facilitates access by Hong Kong banks to the Chinese market and will give them a
comparative advantage over foreign banks until the end of the calendar of application
of WTO commitments (cf. annex 3). It does not, however, lift the totality of restrictions
which apply in the banking sector, in particular on operations in renminbi.
For the Hong Kong banks CEPA:
• lowers the threshold of the amount of assets required for a foreign bank wishing
to establish itself in China, from US$20 billion to US$6 billion; this measure should
allow eight of the Territory’s banks to establish themselves in mainland China.
• allows them to offer services in yuan and in currency two years after opening a
branch, as against the three presently required for a foreign bank; whereas
mainland China demands that foreign banks make a profit in each of their
branches in order to obtain a licence in local currency, CEPA provides that a profit
from the overall group of establishments will suffice for a Hong Kong bank to be
able to offer its services in renminbi.
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• removes the obligation to set up a representative office before the establishment
of a bank in partnership.
• Moreover, CEPA affirms the support of the Chinese authorities for mainland
Chinese banks who wish to move their foreign exchange and cash transaction
centres to Hong Kong (where currency is freely convertible and there are no
controls over capital), or develop a presence in Hong Kong via acquisitions.
Financial markets
CEPA authorises the operator of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Hong Kong Exchanges
and Clearing, to open a representative office in Peking.
Hong Kong stock market professionals can request to exercise their profession in
mainland China according the procedures in force. CEPA does not therefore bring any
substantial modification to the sector, which is gradually opening to foreign
participants, in particular with the application of new regulations which allow a few
selected foreign investors, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII), freer access
to Chinese capital markets; the establishment of QFII being totally disconnected from
CEPA.
Insurance
CEPA makes the following provisions:
• Hong Kong residents of Chinese nationality can exercise their profession in
mainland China without any prior agreement after having obtained the mainland
Chinese professional actuary diploma.
• Hong Kong insurance companies can access the mainland Chinese market through
a strategic merger with a local concern, as long as they abide by the conditions
spelt out in China’s accession agreement to the WTO (no Hong Kong company is
concerned).
• The ceiling on capital investment in a mainland Chinese company is raised from
10% to 15% for Hong Kong insurance companies.
Health
The majority of people working in hospitals and clinics which are joint enterprises
between Hong Kong and the PRC can be permanent residents of the SAR, as an
exception to the rule applied to foreigners.
The maximum length of permits to exercise in the PRC will be extended to three years
for doctors licensed to exercise in Hong Kong, as against one year for other foreign
doctors.
CEPA opens to permanent residents of Hong Kong who are graduates of Hong Kong
University or of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, examinations for access to the
medical professions in the PRC.
Advertising, tourism, public relations
Hong Kong companies are allowed to create wholly-owned subsidiaries.
Audiovisual
• Hong Kong audiovisual product distribution companies (including cinema
products) can form joint enterprises with one or several mainland Chinese
companies and hold up to 70% of the capital.
• In the framework of accession to the WTO, China has committed itself to opening
its market to 20 foreign films per year. Films in Chinese produced by Hong Kong
companies will be distributed outside this quota.
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• Films co-produced by Hong Kong and Chinese companies will be considered to be
Chinese films. The restrictions applied to these co-productions (percentage of
Chinese personnel, links with China) have been relaxed.
• Construction renovation and operation of cinemas in the framework of a joint
venture: Hong Kong companies are allowed to make a majority stake of up to 75%
in joint ventures in this sector (only a minority stake was allowed in the WTO
agreement).
Legal services
The minimum residence requirement for all Hong Kong representatives in the
representative offices of firms of lawyers in the People’s Republic is reduced from six to
two months per year. Hong Kong practitioners are licensed to work for PRC firms. The
fifteen or so Hong Kong lawyers who have acquired a People’s Republic professional
diploma are allowed to exercise in all non-contentious legal matters.
Hong Kong permanent residents with Chinese citizenship are allowed to sit the
professional law examinations in the PRC and will be able to exercise in all non-
contentious legal matters in firms of lawyers in the PRC. However, they may not apply
Chinese law.
Hong Kong legal firms which have representative offices in the People’s Republic are
allowed to exercise jointly with Chinese firms, except in the form of commercial
partnerships.
The most recent statistics, from mid-2003, found 51 subsidiaries of Hong Kong firms (59
offices) in the PRC. CEPA could lead to a noticeable increase in the number of Hong
Kong lawyers in the PRC.
Wholesale and retail trade, imports and exports
The main advantages conceded to Hong Kong companies relate to the possibility of
creating organisations which they control totally before this possibility is opened up to
other foreign companies, and to the relaxing of access criteria, in particular the
lowering of turnover thresholds. The advantage of these measures is called into
question by the new legislation which liberalises access to this type of activity.
“Added value” services in telecommunications
Annex 4 of CEPA allows Hong Kong service providers to establish, from October 1st
2003 (while the measures for the other 17 sectors only came into effect on January 1st
2004), joint ventures in mainland China in order to provide one of the following five
“added value services”: Internet access, call centres, Internet data services, content
provision, “store and forward” services (which secure the transmission of data when
the network is weak or non-existent). Moreover these services can be offered without
any geographical restrictions, which gives Hong Kong companies a little more than a
year’s head start over other foreign companies, to which these measures will apply in
January 2005. However the stake of Hong Kong companies will be restricted to 49%, as
with other foreign companies.
NOTES
1. This article has benefited from the work and comments of Laurence Appert-Versini
and Pascal Fürth, of the French Trade Commission in Hong Kong.
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2. For further information on the various sectors and the measures called for, the
complete text of the CEPA and the annexes can be consulted on the Hong Kong
Government site, http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/. The Hong Kong Trade
Development Council (HKTDC) and the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce
publish abundant documentation on the agreement and its ramifications. Part of this
documentation is available online on their respective sites : www.tdctrade.com and 
www.hkgcc.org.hk.
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